We study the incentive of …rms to acquire partial, controlling, stakes in vertically related …rms and then foreclose a downstream rival. We show that partial acquisition of an upstream supplier (partial backward integration) is more likely to occur and lead to foreclosure than full vertical merger, especially when initially, the upstream supplier is held by dispersed shareholders.
Introduction
One of the main antitrust concerns that vertical mergers raise is that the merger will result in the foreclosure of either upstream or downstream rivals. While most of the discussion on vertical foreclosure has focused on full vertical mergers, in reality, many …rms acquire partial stakes in suppliers (partial backward integration) or in buyers (partial forward integration). A case in point is the U.S. cable industry where several operators acquired partial ownership stakes in cable or television networks (see Waterman and Weiss, 1997, p. 24-32) . This situation has raised the concern that non-integrated networks will be denied access to cable systems or will obtain access at unfavorable terms. 1 In this paper we study partial vertical integration and examine the circumstances under which it may occur and lead to "input foreclosure"i.e., the foreclosure of a downstream rival. The main question that we ask is whether …rms have an incentive to acquire a partial conrolling stake in an upstream supplier or a downstream buyer in the …rst place, and how this incentive depends on the initial ownership structure of the target …rm (the upstream supplier in case of partial backward integration or the downstream buyer in case of partial forward integartion).
To address this question we consider a model in which two downstream …rms buy inputs from several upstream suppliers. Following integration between one of the downstream …rms and one of the upstream suppliers, the upstream supplier may wish to foreclose the remaining downstream rival in order to weaken it and thereby boost its own downstream pro…t. This input foreclosure however lowers the pro…t of the integrated upstream supplier, because it now forgoes sales to the downstream rival. Under partial backward integration, part of the upstream loss from input foreclosure is borne by the minority shareholders of the integrated upstream supplier. Since the downstream buyer captures the entire associated gain, input foreclosure is more pro…table under partial backward integration than under full vertical integration. We show that partial backward integration, which 1 Recent prominent examples include News Corp.'s (a major owner of TV broadcast stations and programming networks) acquisition of a 34% stake in Hughes Electronics Corporation in 2003, which gave it a de facto control over DirecTV Holdings, LLC (a direct broadcast satellite service provider which is wholly-owned by Hughes), and the 2011 joint venture agreement between Comcast, GE, and NBCU, which gave Comcast (the largest cable operator and Internet service provider in the U.S.) a controlling 51% stake in a joint venture that owns broadcast TV networks and stations, and various cable programming. In the UK, BSkyB (a leading TV broadcaster) acquired in 2006 a 17:9% stake in ITV (UK's largest TV content producer). The UK competition commission found that the acquisition gave BSkyB e¤ective control over ITN and argued that BSkyB would use it to "reduce ITV's investment in content" and "in ‡uence investment by ITV in high-de…nition television (HDTV) or in other services requiring additional spectrum." leads to input foreclosure, is particularly pro…table when the upstream supplier is initially held by dispersed shareholders. In that case, the downstream buyer acquires the minimal stake that ensures control over the upstream supplier at a price that re ‡ects the supplier's pre-acquisition value. The downstream buyer then internalizes only the reduction in the value of the stake it acquires. The rest of the upstream loss is borne by the remaining shareholders of the upstream supplier, who e¤ectively subsidize the input foreclosure. 2 However, when the upstream supplier has initially a controlling shareholder, the downstream buyer needs to compensate this shareholder for reduction in the value of his entire stake in order to induce him to sell a controlling stake to the downstream buyer. Since this stake may well exceed the minimal stake that ensures control, backward interagration is more costly when the upstream supplier has a conrolling shareholder and therefore it is less likely to occur and lead to input foreclosure.
By contrast, input foreclosure is less pro…table under partial forward integration than under full vertical integration because part of the downstream gain from foreclosure is now captured by the minority shareholders of the integrated downstream buyer, while the upstream supplier bears the entire cost. We show that this transfer of wealth to the monority shareholders of the upstream supplier renders partial …rward integration unpro…table when the downstream buyer is initially held by dispersed shareholders, although it may be pro…table when the downstream buyer has a controlling shareholder whose controlling stake is su¢ ciently large (i.e., there are relatively few minority shareholder who receive a subsidy).
We also consider a few extensions of our basic setup. First, we consider the possibility that the downstream buyer holds a toehold (i.e., an initial non controlling stake) in the upstream supplier before it has the opportunity to acquire full control. We show that the toehold weakens the incentive of the downstream buyer to acquire control over the upstream supplier and use it to foreclose a downstream rival whenever the upstream supplier is initially held by a controlling shareholder, but not if the upstream suppliers is initially held by dispersed shareholders. Second, we show that the controlling shareholder of a downstream …rm will prefer to acquire control over an upstream supplier through some …rm under his control in which he holds a small stake, rather 2 Of course, if the rights of the passive shareholders of the upstream supplier are protected e¤ectively, the downstream buyer would be unable to use its control to foreclose the downstream rival. In reality, however, it may be very hard to prevent such foreclosure on the grounds that it expropriates the wealth of passive shareholders. Indeed had the protection of passive shareholders been perfect, antitrust authorities would have no reason to be concenred about the possibility of input foreclosure following partial backward integration. The cases mentioned above indicate however that antitrust authorities are concened about this possibility. than acquire control directly. In particular, an acquisition by a controlling shareholder expands the range of parameters for which input foreclosure occurs. Finally, we show that competition between the two downstream …rms for the acuisition of control over an upstream supplier boosts the price paid for the acquired shares, although it does not alter the range of parameters for which foreclosure takes place.
There are three strands in the literature on input foreclosure. 3 Bolton and Whinston (1993) consider a model in which two downstream …rms invest in order to boost the quality of their products before they trade with an upstream supplier. Vertical integration strengthens the incentive of the integrated downstream …rm to invest and weakens the incentive of nonintegrated …rm to invest.
As a rseult, the nonintegrated …rm has a lower chance to buy the input when its supply is limited.
Bolton and Whinston interpret this situation as input foreclosure. Unlike in Bolton and Whinston (1993) , where foreclosure is a by-product of the e¤ect of integration on downstream investments, foreclosure in the other two strands of the literature is due to a deliberate refusal of an upstream supplier to supply the input. In Hart and Tirole (1990) , an upstream supplier prefers to deal exclusively with a single downstream …rm in order to allow this …rm to monopolize the downstream market. The upstream supplier in turn extracts the monopoly downstream pro…t via a non linear contract. The third strand in the literature, due to Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) and Salinger (1988) , considers models in which the vertically integrated …rm deliberately forecloses downstream rivals in order to raise their costs of buying the input from alternative suppliers. This bene…ts the integrated downstream …rm, who now faces weaker rivals in the downstream market. 4 Our model is closely related to the third, raising rival cost, strand. Similarly to these models, the upstream supplier in our model also forecloses the downstream rival in order to give the integrated donwstream …rm a strategic advantage in the downstream market. In our model though, foreclosure does not raise the costs of downstream rivals but rather it dimishes the value that the downstream rival can o¤er consumers. More importantly, our paper focuses on partial, rather than full vertical integration.
There are only few papers which consider the competitive e¤ects of partial vertical integration. Greenlee and Raskovitch (2006) and Hunold, Röller, and Stahl (2012) consider passive acquisitions, which a¤ect the incentive of the acquirer, but do not have a direct e¤ect on the target's strategy like in our paper. We are aware of only two papers which consider the acquisition of partial controling stakes. Baumol and Ordover (1994) show that when a downstream …rm controls a bottleneck owner with a partial ownership stake, it has an incentive to divert business to itself, even if downstream rivals are more e¢ cient, because it fully captures the bene…ts from this diversion, but bears only part of the associated upstream loss. 5 Spiegel (2013) examines a model in the spirit of Bolton and Whinston (1993) , in which foreclosure arises due to the efefct of vertical integration on the incentives of the downstream …rms to invest in the quality of their products. He shows that relative to full vertical integration, partial vertical integration may either alleviates or exacerbate the concern for vertical foreclosure and examine the implications for consumer welfare. Neither one of these papers, however, examines how the incentive to integrate depends on the owneship structure of the target, which is the main focus of the current paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we examine the incentive to engage in "input foreclosure" following partial backward or forward inetgartion. Our main results appear in Section 4, where we examine how the incentive to partially integrate and engage in input foreclosure depend on the initial ownership structure of the target …rm. In Section 5 we study three extensions of our basic setup, and in Section 6 we concude.
In the Appendix we show
The model
Consider two downstream …rms, D 1 and D 2 , that use up to N 1 di¤erentiated inputs to provide a …nal good/service to consumers. Each input i = 1; 2; : : : ; N is produced by a single upstream supplier U i . To simplify matters, we assume that the cost that an upstream supplier incurs when it serves a downstream …rm is c. 6 Let (k; l) denote the (reduced form) pro…t of a downstream …rm when it uses k inputs and its rival uses l inputs, before any payments to upstream suppliers.
Throughout the analysis we will impose the following assumption:
5 Rei¤en (1998) examines the stock market reaction to Union Paci…c (UP) Railroad's attempt in 1995 to gain e¤ective control over Chicago Northwestern (CNW) Railroad with a partial ownership stake. However, he …nds that CNW's stock price reacted positively, rather than negatively, to events that made the merger more likely to be consumeated. This …nding is inconsistent with the idea that UP would have diverted pro…ts from CNW to itself by foreclosing competing railroads. 6 We can easily modify this linearity and assume that the cost of serving only one downstream …rm is c1 and the cost of serving two is c2 > c1.
A1 (k; l) is increasing with k at a decreasing rate and decreasing with l For example, D 1 and D 2 can be two cable or satellite TV providers, which buy content TV channels in the upstream content market, or online retailers, who sell di¤erent brands on their websites. Assumption A1 is then natural in these cases since, other things being equal, a cable TV provider faces a higher demand when it o¤ers more channels while his rival o¤ers less and likewise, an online retailer faces a higher demand when it o¤ers more brands and its rival o¤ers fewer brands.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the outset, all …rms are independently owned. Then, either one downstream …rm, D 1 , acquires a controlling stake in upstream supplier U 1 (backward integration), or U 1 acquires a controlling stake in D 1 (forward integration); we denote the minimal ownership stake that gives the acquirer control over the target by . 7 We will say that integration is partial if < 1. Hence, under partial backward integration, D 1 acquires a stake < 1 in U 1 , while under partial forward integration U 1 acquires a stake
Given the new ownership structure, each of N upstream suppliers decides whether to supply the input to both downstream …rms or to only one. These decisions are publicly observable and irreversible. 8 The upstream suppliers then make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the downstream …rms.
Inputs are then procured, and the …nal product is produced and payo¤ are realized.
Incentives for input foreclosure
In this section, we examine the incentive of U 1 to vertically foreclose D 2 under four scenarios: (i) U 1 is independent of D 1 , (ii) U 1 and D 1 are fully integrated (full integration), (iii) D 1 has a partial ownership stake in U 1 (partial backward integration), and (iv) U 1 has a partial ownership stake in
7 Typically the assumption in the literature is that = 50%. In reality, though, can be well below 50%. , "Acquisition by British Sky Broadcasting Group plc of 17.9 per cent of the Shares in ITV plc").We will therefore not impose restrictions on . 8 This assumption can be justi…ed as in Church and Gandal (2000) and Choi and Yi (2000) , where each upstream …rm needs to adapt the input to the special needs of each downstream …rm. The assumption allows us to sidestep the "commitment problem," which arise for example in Ordover, Salop, and Saloner (1990) .
Before we turn to the di¤erent scenarios, we …rst consider the second stage of the game, in which the N upstream suppliers make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the two downstream …rms. To …x ideas, suppose that downstream …rm D i already buys k 1 inputs and downstream …rm D j buys l inputs. The marginal willingness of D i to pay for the k'th input is
This expression represents the incremental pro…t of D i from adding the k'th input, given that the rival, D j , uses l inputs. Assumption A1 implies that 1 (k; l) is positive but decreasing with k.
For later use, let us denote the externality that an increase in the number of inputs used by D j imposes on D i 's pro…t by
By Assumption A1, 2 (k; l) < 0 for all k and l.
To ensure that selling N inputs is pro…table, we will make the following assumption:
While Assumption A2 ensures that selling inputs is pro…table if both downstream …rms buy all N inputs, it is possible that an upstream supplier may prefer to sell its input to only one of the two downstream …rms. To see why, note that when D j increases the number of inputs it uses from l 1 to l, the marginal willingness of D i to pay for input l changes by
Although in general 12 (N; N ) could be either positive or negative, the example that we present in the Appendix shows that it is reasonable to assume that 12 (N; N ) < 0. That is, the marginal willingness of D i to pay for inputs decreases when D j is using an extra input. For the sake of concreteness, we will assume that this is indeed the case:
Given that selling an extra input to D j depresses the price that D i is willing to pay, at least in principle, it could be that an upstream …rm may be unwilling to supply both downstream …rms.
The following assumption rules out this possibility and ensures that under non-integration, both downstream …rms buy all N inputs: to pay for inputs is 1 (N k 1 ; N k 2 ). Since the upstream suppliers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the two downstream …rms, in equilibrium, each downstream …rm pays a price equal to its marginal willingness to pay. Consequently, the pro…t of each supplier that sells exclusively to D 1 is
If the supplier also sells to D 2 , its pro…t becomes:
The price that D 1 pays
The price that D 2 pays 2c:
Selling to both D 1 and D 2 is more pro…table since
where the inequality follows from Assumption A4. A similar argument applies when suppliers sell exclusively to D 2 . Hence, in equilibrium, suppliers 2; : : : ; N sell to both D 1 and D 2 .
The last part of the lemma follows because D 1 and D 2 pay input prices that re ‡ect their marginal willingness to pay:
Given Lemma 1, we only need to consider the equilibrium behavior of U 1 . Clearly, if U 1 is not integrated with D 1 (fully or partially), then its equilibrium behavior is no di¤erent than that of other upstream suppliers. Hence, we can report the following Corollary to Lemma 1.
Corollary 1: Under non-integration, both D 1 and D 2 buy all N inputs at a price of 1 (N; N ).
The resulting pro…t of each downstream …rm is
while the pro…t of each upstream supplier is
Note that the equilibrium pro…t of each downstream …rm is positive since (N;
where the inequality follows because 11 ( ; ) < 0 implies that 1 (k; N ) > 1 (N; N ) for all k < N . The equilibrium pro…t of upstream suppliers is pro…table by Assumption A2.
We next characterize the equilibrium under no integration, full integration, partial backward integration, and partial forward integration. As we shall see, in this cases, foreclosure might arise in equilibrium.
Full vertical integration
Under full vertical integration, D 1 and U 1 fully merge to create a new …rm, which we call DU 1 .
Given Lemma 1, we only need to check whether the integrated …rm, DU 1 , is interested in selling the input to D 2 and if so, at which price.
To this end, let w denote the price that D 1 pays U 1 for the input. Since D 1 and U 1 are fully merged, w is merely a transfer payment within the same organization, and hence it is irrelevant.
However, under partial integration, w matters. In particular, when D 1 partially controls U 1 , it would like to set w as low as possible, in which case, D 1 essentially expropriates the wealth of U 1 's non-controlling shareholders. In the opposite case where U 1 partially controls D 1 , U 1 would like to set w as high as possible, in order to expropriate the wealth of D 1 's non-controlling shareholders.
This means that in principle, there are two channels through which partial ownership matters: (i) it can lead to the foreclosure of D 2 , and (ii) it can lead to a distortion of w and hence to a transfer of wealth from U 1 to D 1 or vice versa. The second channel however can arise even if D 1 were a monopoly in the downstream market and hence is not directly related to the interaction between vertical integration and competition which is our main focus. We will therefore "shut down" this channel by assuming that U 1 cannot discriminate in favor of or against D 1 and hence w must be equal to the price that all other upstream suppliers charge for their inputs. 9 Using Lemma 1, this price is w = 1 (N; N 1) if D 2 is foreclosed, and w = 1 (N; N ) if D 2 is not foreclosed.
If DU 1 sells to D 2 , then both downstream …rms buy all N inputs, so the marginal willingness of each of them to pay for inputs (and hence the price of each input) is 1 (N; N ). Hence, the
, then the willingness of D 1 to pay for inputs increases to 1 (N; N 1), so the downstream pro…t of DU 1 becomes
while the upstream pro…t of DU 1 becomes
Overall, the pro…t of
Using equations (1), (2), (3), and (4), this is true whenever
where
To interpret (5), note that L represents the loss of upstream pro…t due to foreclosure: 1 (N; N ) c represents the forgone upstream pro…t due to the foreclosure of D 2 , and 12 (N; N ) 1 (N; N ) 1 (N; N 1) < 0 is the increase in the price that the upstream unit of DU 1 charges the downstream unit of DU 1 when D 2 is foreclosed (in which case the willingness of DU 1 's downstream unit to pay for inputs increases from 1 (N; N ) to 1 (N; N 1)). 10 This price increase cuts the upstream loss from foreclosure, though by Assumption A4, overall, L > 0.
The e¤ect of foreclosure on the downstream pro…t of DU 1 is represented by G. The …rst term, 2 (N; N ) ( (N; N ) (N; N 1)), is the extra downstream pro…t that DU 1 makes due to the foreclosure of D 2 . The second term re ‡ects the idea that once D 2 is foreclosed, the willingness of D 1 to pay for inputs increases from 1 (N; N ) to 1 (N; N 1); since D 1 buys N inputs and since we assume that upstream suppliers have all the bargaining power, the total increase in DU 1 's payment for inputs is N 12 (N; N ). As far as know, this adverse e¤ect of foreclosure on input prices has not been identi…ed earlier in the literature. Of course, this e¤ect is extreme in our model due to our assumption that upstream suppliers have all the bargaining power when they negotiate with downstream …rms. This e¤ect will be less extreme if downstream …rms were to have some bargaining power too and it would disappear altogether if the downstream …rm were to make the upstream suppliers take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers.
We can now summarize the discussion as follows:
Lemma 2: Suppose that D 1 and U 1 fully integrated. Then there exists a unique equilibrium in which the integrated …rm DU 1 forecloses D 2 if and only if G L.
Since L > 0 by Assumption A4 (foreclosure entails a loss of upstream pro…ts), Lemma 2 implies that a necessary (though not su¢ cient) condition for foreclosure under full integration is that G > 0. That is, foreclosure must boost the downstream pro…t of DU 1 . When G < 0, foreclosure never arises in equilibrium. To make the analysis interesting, we will therefore impose the following assumption:
Partial backward integration
Now suppose that D 1 acquires a fraction 2 [ ; 1) of U 1 's shares, where is the minimal equity stake that gives D 1 full control over U 1 . The remaining 1 stake in U 1 is held by dispersed, passive, shareholders.
To characterize the equilibrium, we will follow the same steps as in the full integration case.
The only di¤erence is that now, U 1 's decisions are taken by D 1 with the objective of maximizing D 1 's pro…t, plus times U 1 's pro…t, instead of maximizing the joint pro…t of D 1 and U 1 (the di¤erence then is that now < 1, while under full integration, e¤ectively = 1).
Given Lemma 1, we only need to consider D 1 's decision on whether to use its control over
is not foreclosed then by corollary 1, the pro…ts of
which implies in turn that
Since L > 0 by Assumption A4, (6) is more likely to hold when is small. This implies in turn that D 1 would like to use its control over U 1 to foreclose D 2 only when is su¢ ciently small.
Intuitively, under partial backward integration, D 1 bears only a fraction of the loss L to U 1 from foreclosing D 2 , but it captures the entire downstream gain, G. Hence, D 1 has a stronger incentive to use its control to foreclose D 2 , relative to the full information case. Moreover, this incentive becomes stronger as decreases.
To reduce the number of cases we need consider, we now impose the following assumption:
Assumption A6 implies that there exists a range of ownership stakes, ; min G L ; 1 , that give D 1 control over U 1 and induce D 1 to use its control over U 1 to foreclose D 2 . Without this assumption, D 1 will never …nd it optimal, when it controls U 1 , to foreclose D 2 . We can now summarize the discussion in the following lemma: 
Partial forward integration
Next, we consider the case where U 1 acquires a fraction 2 [ ; 1) of D 1 's shares. As before, is the minimal equity stake that gives the acquirer, U 1 in this case, full control over the target's operating decisions. The remaining 1 stake in D 1 is held by dispersed, passive, shareholders.
To characterize the equilibrium, note from Corollary 1 that under non-foreclosure, the pro…ts of
which holds whenever
Equation (7) shows that U 1 would like to foreclose D 2 only when is su¢ ciently large.
Intuitively, under forward integration, U 1 bears the entire upstream loss from foreclosing 
Comparison
Having characterized the equilibrium under the full integration, partial backward integration, and partial forward integration, the following proposition follows immediately from Lemmas 2-4:
Proposition 1: Partial backward integration expands the range of parameters for which D 2 is foreclosed relative to full integration, while partial forward integration shrinks it. Moreover, if foreclosure is pro…table under full integration, i.e., G L, then partial backward integration always leads to foreclosure, while partial forward integration leads to foreclosure only when is su¢ ciently close to 1. And, if foreclosure is not pro…table under full integration, i.e., G < L, then partial backward integration leads to foreclosure only when is su¢ ciently small, while partial forward integration never leads to foreclosure.
Proposition 1 is reminiscent of Baumol and Ordover (1994) . It shows that partial backward integration raises the concern for input foreclosure, while partial forward integration alleviates this concern.
We conclude this section by examining how our results change when we relax the assumption that the upstream suppliers can make the two downstream …rms take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. To 
while their pre-acquisition values are
As a result, the upstream loss from foreclosure becomes
and the downstream gain from foreclosure becomes
By Assumptions A3 and A4, L is increasing, while G is decreasing with . Hence, Proposition 2: An increase in the bargaining power of upstream suppliers vis-a-vis downstream …rms shrinks the range of parameters for which D 2 is foreclosed.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is simple: an increase in the bargaining power of upstream suppliers vis-a-vis downstream …rms boosts the upstream pro…ts and depresses the downstream pro…ts. Since input foreclosure shifts pro…ts from the upstream …rm to the downstream …rm, an increase in the bargaining power of upstream suppliers makes foreclosure less attractive.
Input foreclosure under endogenous ownership structure
So far we considered the incentive of a vertically integrated …rm to foreclose a downstream rival.
We now examine the incentive to vertically integrate in the …rst place. To this end, we assume that initially D 1 and U 1 are not integrated, and then we ask whether D 1 would like to acquire a controlling stake, , in U (backward integration), or U 1 would like to acquire a controlling stake, , in D 1 (forward integration), and examine how this incentive depends on the initial ownership structure of the target …rm.
Speci…cally, we consider two cases:
(i) Initially, the target (U 1 in the case of partial forward integration and D 1 in the case of partial backward integration) has a single controlling shareholder whose stake is C 2 [ ; 1]; the remaining 1 C stake in U 1 (if any) is held by passive shareholders.
(ii) Initially, the target is owned by a mass 1 of atomistic, dispersed, shareholders.
Backward integration: U 1 has initially a single controlling shareholder
In this section we examine the incentive of D 1 to acquire a controlling stake
from U 1 's initial controller (whose initial stake is C ). To acquire , D 1 makes U 1 's controller a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er b, although as we shall see below, the assumption that D 1 has all the bargaining power vis-a-vis U 1 's controller is not essential. If D 1 's o¤er is accepted, D 1 becomes the new controlling shareholder in U 1 . 11 We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 5: Acquisition of a partial controlling stake in U 1 , which is not followed by the foreclosure of D 2 , is pro…table for D 1 if and only if the post-acquisition price w that D 1 pays U 1 for the input is below 1 (N; N ), which is the price that all other upstream suppliers charge for the input.
Proof: We begin by considering the price that D 1 needs to pay in order to acquire the controlling stake, , in U 1 . If D 2 is not foreclosed following the acquisition, then the post-acquisition value of
where w c is U 1 's pro…t from selling to D 1 and 1 (N; N ) c is the pro…t from selling to D 2 . By
Corollary 1, the pre-acquisition value of U 1 , V U 0 , is given by (2).
1 1 Since the value of U1's shares is the same to all shareholders other than D1, it is immaterial for the analysis whether the initial controller of U1 retains a minority stake C , or sells this minority stake (fully or partially) to disperssed shareholder.
Using these expressions, the minimal acceptable bid, b U , must leave U 1 's controller indi¤er-ent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er:
Hence,
where the second equality follows from (2) and (8). Consequently, if D 1 acquires a controlling stake, , in U 1 , its payo¤ becomes:
where (N; N ) is the downstream pro…t of D 1 and (N 1) 1 (N; N ) is the total payment of D 1 to non-integrated upstream suppliers. If D 1 does not acquire a controlling stake in U 1 , then by Corollary 1, its payo¤, V D 0 , is given by (1). The di¤erence between D 1 's payo¤ with and without the acquisition is given by the di¤er-ence between (10) and (1):
The last expression is positive if and only if w < 1 (N; N ).
The idea behind Lemma 5 is simple: so long as w < 1 (N; N ), D 1 uses its control over U 1 to force U 1 to sell it the input at an arti…cially low price. This is pro…table for D 1 because it expropriates some of the wealth of U 1 's passive shareholders. As mentioned in Section 3.1, this motive for partial vertical integration exists even if there is no competition with rival …rms either in the downstream or the upstream markets; we will therefore abstract from this consideration by assuming that under integration (full or partial), D 1 pays U 1 the same input price that it pays other upstream suppliers. That is, w = 1 (N; N 1) if D 2 is foreclosed, and
is not foreclosed. Now, consider the case where D 2 is foreclosed after D 1 acquires control over U 1 . Then, the post-acquisition value of U 1 is V U 1 , so analogously to (9), the minimal acceptable o¤er is given by,
That is, b U is equal to the post-acquisition value of the acquired shares, V U 1 , plus a premium, C L, which compensates the initial controller of U 1 for the loss in the value of his initial stake due to the foreclosure of D 2 .
But will D 1 agree to pay b U for a controlling stake in U 1 ? To answer this question, note that since w = 1 (N; N 1) when D 2 is foreclosed, D 1 's payo¤ when it acquires a controlling stake in U 1 and then forecloses D 2 is:
Notice that this expression depends on C , which is the size of the controlling stake that the initial controller of U 1 holds, but not on the actual size of the acquired stake, . The reason is that D 1 pays U 1 's controller a fair price for the shares it acquires, plus a premium that fully compensates U 1 's initial controller for the drop in the value of the stake that he retains in U 1 . Since D 1 bears the loss of value on the stake it acquires, it fully internalizes the loss to the entire stake C due to foreclosure (a fraction 1 C of the loss is borne by the passive shareholders of U 1 ).
D 1 will therefore acquire a controlling stake in U 1 and use it to foreclose D 2 if and only if its post-acquisition payo¤ exceeds its pre-acquisition payo¤, which by Corollary 1 equals
Since this condition is independent of the acquired stake, , D 1 is indi¤erent to size of its controlling stake (provided of course that it is above ). 12 Since L > 0 by Assumption A4, it is clear that (12) is more likely to hold when C is small.
Proposition 3: Suppose that initially, U 1 has a single controlling shareholder. Then, in equilibrium, D 1 will acquire a controlling stake in U 1 and use it to foreclose D 2 if and only if G C L: In particular, the acquisition takes place for all
and whenever L G < L, it takes place only when C is su¢ ciently close to :
Proposition 3 implies that if U 1 is initially controlled by a single shareholder and if full vertical integration leads foreclosure, i.e., G L, then D 1 will surely acquire control in U 1 and use it to foreclose D 2 . On the other hand, when full vertical integration does not lead to foreclosure, i.e., G < L, then D 1 may still acquire control over U 1 and then foreclose D 2 , but only when the initial stake of U 1 's controller is su¢ ciently small. In other words, the proposition suggests that antitrust authorities should be more concerned with backward integration when the controlling stake is acquired from an initial controller whose controlling stake is relatively small.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the above results would continue to hold even if D 1
does not have all the bargaining power vis-a-vis U 1 's initial controller. To see why, note that the joint payo¤ of D 1 and U 1 's initial controller if the acquisition goes through is
Hence, their joint surplus from partial backward integration is
Hence, transferring control over U 1 to D 1 is jointly pro…table if and only if (12) holds (otherwise, either D 1 is not interested in acquiring control over U 1 , or U 1 's initial controller is not interested in selling it). 13
Backward integration: U 1 ' s ownership is initially dispersed
We now turn to the case where U 1 is initially held by dispersed shareholders. Speci…cally, we will follow Grossman and Hart (1980) and assume that U 1 is initially held by a continuum of atomistic shareholders, whose total mass is 1. In order to acquire a controlling stake in U 1 , D 1 makes a tender o¤er to U 1 's initial shareholders at a price that re ‡ects a value V for the entire …rm. Below we solve for the equilibrium value of V and also determine whether D 1 would wish to make the o¤er restricted and specify a limit on the stake it is willing to acquires (if the tendered stake exceeds the limit, the submitted shares of each tendering shareholder are prorated). We will say that the tender o¤er succeeds if D 1 manages to acquire at least a stake of (and gains control over U 1 ), and we will say that the tender o¤er fails if D 1 does not acquire a stake of at least .
To characterize the equilibrium, recall that the pre-acquisition value of U 1 is V U 0 , and its post-acquisition value is V U 1 , and note that if V U 1 < V < V U 0 , then it is optimal for each shareholder to tender his shares if the tender o¤er succeeds (and then get V > V U 1 for the tendered shares), but not if it fails (in which case the shareholder gets V < V U 0 for the sold shares). 14 Hence, there exist multiple equilibria in this case. For example, it is an equilibrium for all shareholder to tender their shares (the o¤er succeeds even if a single shareholder deviates and does not tender his shares), and it is also an equilibrium for all shareholders not to tender their shares (the o¤er fails even if a single shareholder deviates and does tender his shares). However, since V U 0 V U 1 , equilibria in which the tender o¤er fails Pareto dominate equilibria in which the tender o¤er succeeds. We will therefore assume that whenever V U 1 < V < V U 0 , a non-tendering equilibrium is played. With this assumption in place, we now prove the following lemma.
Proof: First, notice that if V V U 1 (the price per share is below the post-acquisition value), then it is a dominant strategy for each shareholder not to tender. And, given the assumption in the lemma, shareholders also do not tender if V U 1 < V < V U 0 . Hence, the tender o¤er fails for sure if V < V U 0 . By contrast, if V V U 0 , then it is a weakly dominant strategy for each shareholder to fully tender his shares: if the tender o¤er succeeds, the shareholder gets V U 0 on the sold shares, but gets only V U 1 < V U 0 on retained shares; if the tender o¤er fails, the value of the shares is V U 0 regardless of whether they are tendered. Since the tender o¤er surely succeeds, it is optimal for D 1 to set V = V U 0 , which is the lowest o¤er that ensures that the tender o¤er succeeds.
Lemma 6 implies that D 1 has no incentive to acquire control over U 1 if D 2 is not foreclosed following the acquisition. This is because absent foreclosure, D 1 's pro…t remains V D 0 and since D 1 breaks even on the acquisition (the acquisition price absent foreclosure is V U 0 , which is also the post-acquisition value of D 1 's stake in U 1 ). The lemma also implies that if D 2 is foreclosed, D 1 wishes to buy the minimal stake, , which ensures control, since the price of the acquired shares exceeds their post-acquisition value.
1 4 If the o¤er is conditional on success, the shareholder is indi¤erent about submitting shares when the o¤er fails.
The remaining question now is whether the acquisition is pro…table for D 1 if it does lead to the foreclosure of D 2 . 15 We address this question in the next proposition:
Proposition 4: Suppose that initially, U 1 's ownership is dispersed. Then, in equilibrium, D 1 will acquire a controlling stake in U 1 and will use it to foreclose D 2 if and only if G L. If this condition holds, D 1 will acquire the minimal stake that ensures control over U 1 , i.e., , by making a restricted tender o¤ er.
Proof: Since V = V U 0 , acquiring a controlling stake in U 1 costs D 1 a total of V U 0 . Recalling that when D 2 is foreclosed w = 1 (N; N 1) , the post-acquisition payo¤ of D 1 is
Recalling that the pre-acquisition payo¤ of D 1 , V D 0 , is given by (1), and recalling that
Since L > 0 by Assumption A4, it is clear that D 1 would never acquire more than the minimal stake that ensures control, namely, . Acquiring a stake in U 1 is pro…table, however, if and only if G L. To ensure that the acquired stake does not exceed , D 1 will make his o¤er restricted and specify that if the tendered stake exceeds , the submitted shares of each tendering shareholder will be prorated such that D 1 acquires exactly a stake of .
Since C , Propositions 3 and 4 imply that there is a wider range of parameters for which D 1 acquires a controlling stake in U 1 and uses it to foreclose D 2 when U 1 is initially owned by dispersed shareholders, than when U 1 has initially a single controlling shareholder. Intuitively, the acquisition of U 1 by D 1 lowers U 1 's value since D 1 uses U 1 to foreclose D 2 and hence it e¤ectively diverts pro…ts from U 1 to D 1 . Although in both cases D 1 needs to pay the sellers a price that re ‡ects the pre-acquisition value of U 1 , in the case of an initial controller, D 1 must also compensate the controller for his remaining stake in U 1 , C . By contrast, in the case of dispersed shareholders, 1 5 One may wonder whether a large shareholder may wish to acquire a su¢ ciently large stake from the dispersed shareholders of U1 and use it to oppose D1's decision to foreclosure D2. Such an action would raise the value of U1
But since the dispersed shareholders of U1 are atomistic, the large shareholder would have to pay them the post-acquisition value of their shares (as in Grossman and Hart, 1980) in order to induce them to submit their shares. As a result, the acquisition is not pro…table for the large shareholder. 
Forward integration: D 1 has initially a single controlling shareholder
We now consider the case where U 1 integrates forward by acquiring a controlling stake 2 [ ; C ) in D 1 from the initial controller of D 1 . Again, we will assume that the acquirer, here U 1 , makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er b for the stake , but as in the partial backward integration case, this assumption is not essential. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 7: Acquisition of a partial controlling stake in D 1 , which is not followed by a foreclosure of D 2 , is pro…table for U 1 if and only if the post-acquisition price, w, that D 1 pays U 1 for the input exceeds 1 (N; N ) , which is the price that all other upstream suppliers charge for the input. 
where w is the price that D 1 pays U 1 for the input. By Corollary 1, the pre-acquisition value of
, is given by (1). Analogously to Lemma 5, the minimal acceptable bid is
where the third equality follows from (1) and (13).
Therefore, if U 1 acquires a controlling stake in D 1 , its payo¤ becomes:
If D 1 does not acquire a controlling stake in U 1 , then by Corollary 1, its payo¤ is V U 0 , given by (2). The di¤erence between U 1 's post-and pre-acquisition payo¤ is therefore:
The expression is positive if and only if w > 1 (N; N ).
Lemma 7 implies that it pays U 1 to acquire a controlling stake in D 1 without foreclosing D 2 only when it can expropriate the wealth of D 1 's passive shareholders by selling the input to D 1 at a price that exceeds the price at which it sells the input to D 2 and above the price that D 1 pays all other upstream suppliers. As before, we shall rule out this possibility; this implies in turn that forward integration is feasible only if it leads to the foreclosure of D 2 .
We now consider the possibility that U 1 acquires a controlling stake in D 1 , and then uses it to foreclose D 2 . Analogously to (14), the minimal b needed to induce D 1 's initial controller to accept U 1 's o¤er is,
where the third equality follows because
. Equation (16) shows that b D is equal to the post-acquisition value of the acquired shares, V D 1 , minus a discount, C G, which is equal to the appreciation in the value of the initial stake of D 1 's initial controller due to the foreclosure of
To determine if o¤ering b D is pro…table for U 1 , notice that U 1 's payo¤ if it gains control over D 1 and then forecloses D 2 is:
If U 1 does not acquire a controlling stake in D 1 , its payo¤, V U 0 , is given by (2). In equilibrium, U 1 will acquire a controlling stake in D 1 and then foreclose D 2 if and only if its post-acquisition payo¤ exceeds its pre-acquisition payo¤:
Since L > 0 by Assumption A4, this condition is more likely to hold when C is large. Since the condition is independent of the acquired stake, , U 1 is indi¤erent to its …nal stake in D 1 , provided that it is high enough to ensure control.
Notice that the joint payo¤ of U 1 and D 1 's initial controller if the acquisition goes through is V U 1 + C V D 1 , whereas their joint payo¤ without an acquisition is V U 0 + C V D 0 . Hence, the joint surplus from partial backward integration is,
Condition (17) then says that U 1 will acquire a controlling stake in D 1 if and only if the acquisition is jointly pro…table for U 1 and D 1 's controller. This implies in turn that the relative bargaining powers of the two parties only determine how the joint surplus is divided between them, but not whether the acquisitions will take place.
Proposition 5: Suppose that initially, D 1 has a single controlling shareholder. Then, in equilibrium, U 1 will acquire a controlling stake in D 1 and will foreclose D 2 if and only if C G L: In particular, the acquisition takes place for all
and if G L < G, the acquisition takes place only when C is su¢ ciently close to 1:
Proposition 5 implies that if full vertical integration does not lead to foreclosure, i.e., G < L, then it never pays U 1 to integrate forward when D 1 is initially controlled by a single shareholder.
On the other hand, when full vertical integration does lead to foreclosure, i.e., G L, then U 1 may wish to integrate forward and then foreclose D 2 , provided that the ownership stake of D 1 's initial controller is su¢ ciently large.
Forward integration: D 1 ' s ownership is initially dispersed
When D 1 's shareholders are atomistic, no shareholder is pivotal; since the acquisition boosts the value of D 1 , it is a dominant strategy for each shareholder to hold on to his share if V is below the post-acquisition value of D 1 . 16 Hence, in equilibrium, U 1 must set V equal to the post-acquisition value of D 1 , implying that it breaks even on the share it acquires. 17 Consequently, the acquisition 1 6 The situation is then di¤erent from the one considered in Section 4.2 where the acuisition lowered the target's value. In that case, whether it is optimal to submit shares or not depends on whether other shareholders submit their shares. 1 7 This result is just the Grossman and Hart (1980) free rider problem: when a takeover is value-increasing, the acquirer must o¤er a price that re ‡ects the post-acquisition value of the target, otherwise it is a dominant strategy for a¤ects U 1 only through its direct e¤ect on U 1 . 
Extensions

Toeholds
We now examine what happens when, at the outset, D 1 already holds a non-controlling stake, 1 < , in U 1 (i.e., a toehold). To gain control over U 1 , D 1 must acquire an additional stake 1 in U 1 , such that after the acquisition, its controlling stake in U 1 is .
Proposition 7: Suppose that initially, D 1 holds a non-controlling stake (toehold), 1 , in U 1 . Then, the toehold has no e¤ ect on the equilibrium if U 1 is initially held by dispersed shareholders. When U 1 has initially a single controlling shareholder, then, in equilibrium, D 1 will acquire a controlling stake in U 1 and will use it to foreclose D 2 if and only if G ( C + 1 ) L; in particular, D 1 's toehold shrinks the range of parameters for which D 2 is foreclosed.
Proof: First, suppose that U 1 is initially held by a continuum of atomistic shareholders. By Lemma 6, D 1 will o¤er these shareholders a price that re ‡ects a value of V U 0 for the entire …rm and will therefore pay a total of ( 1 ) V U 0 for the acquired stake. If D 2 is not foreclosed after the acquisition, then the post-acquisition values of D 1 and U 1 are equal to their pre-acquisition values,
Since this is also D 1 's payo¤ without acquisition, D 1 has no incentive to acquire control over U 1 .
each shareholder to hold on to his shares. Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) and Holmstrom and Nalebu¤ (1992) show that the free-rider problem depends crucially on the assumptions that there is a continuum of shareholders rather than …nitely many shareholders and on the fact that the acquirer has no private information about the post-acquisition value of the …rm.
If the acquisition is followed by the foreclosure of D 2 , then U 1 's pro…t, V U 1 , is given by (4), while D 1 's pro…t, V D 1 , is given by (3). Now, D 1 's post-acquisition payo¤ is given by
Since L < 0, D 1 would only acquire the minimal amount of shares which ensures control, i.e., 1 , such that its post-acquisition stake in U 1 will be . Noting that D 1 's pre-acquisition payo¤ is V D 0 + 1 V U 0 , the acquisition of 1 shares in U 1 is pro…table if and only if
This condition, however, is identical to that in Proposition 4, so the existence of a toehold does not a¤ect the equilibrium.
Next, consider the case where U 1 is initially controlled by a single shareholder, whose initial stake is C . If D 2 is not foreclosed after the acquisition, then the minimal o¤er that D 1 needs to make to induce U 1 's initial controller to accept is given by (9), except that now, the acquired stake is 1 (the di¤erence between the …nal stake and the toehold) rather than . Moreover, since
we assume that w = 1 (N; N ) when D 2 is not foreclosed, the post-acquisition value of U 1 equals its pre-acquisition value, i.e., V U 1 = V U 0 , so
where V U 0 is given by (1). Since D 1 's pro…t absent foreclosure is V D 0 , the post-acquisition payo¤ of D 1 is:
Since this expression is also equal to D 1 's payo¤ without the acquisition, D 1 has no incentive to acquire control over U 1 if it does not use it to foreclose D 2 . Now suppose that following an acquisition, D 1 uses its control over U 1 to foreclose D 2 .
Then, the minimal acceptable o¤er that D 1 needs to make is given by (11), except that now, 1 replaces than . Consequently, D 1 's post-acquisition payo¤ becomes,
where V U 1 is given by equation (4). Noting that without acquisition, D 1 's payo¤ is V D 0 + 1 V U 0 , and using the de…nitions of L and G, D 1 will make the o¤er if and only if his post-acquisition payo¤ exceeds his pre-acquisition payo¤, i.e.,
Intuitively, when U 1 's ownership is initially dispersed, D 1 must pay the initial shareholders a price equal to the pre-acquisition value of U 1 . As a result, D 1 bears the entire loss in the value of these shares. When D 1 already owns a toehold, it needs to buy fewer shares to gain control over U 1 , so it saves on the cost of acquiring shares, but this saving is exactly o¤set by the decline in the value of its toehold. Hence, D 1 bears a cost equal to L, irrespective of how is divided between the toehold, 1 , and the acquired stake, 1 . As a result, the toehold does not a¤ect the equilibrium.
By contrast, when U 1 initially has a controlling shareholder, a toehold in U 1 makes it more costly for D 1 to foreclose D 2 , since it lowers the value of D 1 's toehold. In other words, D 1 internalizes a larger part of the loss of upstream pro…t and hence is more reluctant to incur these loses in order to boost its downstream pro…ts. From a competitive standpoint, this implies in turn that a toehold is actually pro-competitive when initially U 1 has a controlling shareholder.
Acquisition by a controller
So far we have assumed that vertical integration arises when D 1 buys a controlling stake in U 1 or U 1 buys a controlling stake in D 1 . However, there are cases in which the controlling shareholders of a …rm (rather than the …rm itself) buys a controlling stake in a vertically related …rm, either directly, Commission expressed the concern that after the acquisition, IPIC, which was the controlling shareholder of Agrolinz Melamine International (AMI) (one of the leading melamine producers world-wide), would foreclose AMI's competitors from Eurotecnica's technology. 19 In this subsection we study how acquisitions by controllers a¤ect the concern for foreclosure. The di¤erence between the controller's payo¤ with and without acquisition is then
From (11) we know that if U 1 has initially a controlling shareholder, then
Likewise, we know from Lemma 6 that if U 1 's ownership is initially dispersed, then b = V U 0 . Hence,
Note immediately that without foreclosure, G = L = 0, so acquisition has no e¤ect on the controller's payo¤. Moreover, note that I is independent of in (19), but is decreasing with in (20).
Hence, D 1 's controller is indi¤erent to the precise stake he acquires in U 1 if he acquires it from an initial controller in U 1 , but will prefer to acquire the minimal stake that ensures control if U 1 's ownership is initially dispersed. Moreover, since I is decreasing with i and increasing with 1 in both (19) and (20), D 1 's controller will prefer to acquire the controlling stake in U 1 through the …rm in which he holds the minimal controlling stake and will have a stronger incentive to acquire control over D 2 when his controlling stake in D 1 is large. These observations imply the following result:
Proposition 8: Suppose that D 1 has controlling shareholder who also owns controlling shares in …rms from other industries and let k be the …rm in which his controlling stake, k , is the lowest, i.e., k i for all i = 1; : : : ; m. Then, in equilibrium, D 1 will acquire a controlling stake in U 1 through …rm k and will use it to foreclose D 2 if and only if 1 G k b L, where b = C when U 1 has initially a single controlling shareholder, and b = when U 1 is initially held by dispersed shareholders. In the latter case, D 1 will acquire the minimal stake that ensures control over U 1 , i.e., , by making the tender o¤ er restricted.
Since by de…nition, k 1 , it is clear that the ability of D 1 's controller to choose whether to acquire a controlling stake in U 1 through D 1 or through another …rm which he controls, expands the range of parameters for which D 2 is foreclosed (unless D 1 happens to be the …rm in which the controller has the lowest controlling stake among all …rms under his controls). Moreover, so long as k < 1, the controller will not acquire a controlling stake in U 1 directly, but rather through …rm k. Intuitively, when the controller has a small stake in …rm k, a large fraction of the upstream loss from foreclosing D 2 is borne by the passive shareholders of k. And, when 1 is large, a large fraction of the associated downstream gain accrues to the controller. Hence, acquiring a controlling stake in U 1 and using it to foreclose D 2 is more attractive when k is small and 1 is large.
Competition for the acquisition of a controlling stake in U 1
In this section we maintain the assumption that U 1 is the only potential upstream target, but we now consider the possibility that both D 1 and D 2 will compete for acquiring U 1 . We begin by considering the case where U 1 has a single controlling shareholder.
Suppose that D 1 and D 2 simultaneously o¤er U 1 's initial controller payments b 1 and b 2 for controlling stakes 1 and 2 in U 1 , and suppose that the controller accepts D i 's o¤er.
Using b V U 1 to denote the post-acquisition payo¤ of U 1 , the payo¤ of U 1 's controller becomes
is not foreclosed, and i is the premium that D i pays for the acquired stake above and beyond its post-acquisition value. Since C b V U 1 is constant, it is obvious that U 1 's controller will accept the o¤er with the highest premium i , provided that his resulting payo¤, C b V U 1 + i , is at least as high as C V U 0 , which is his payo¤ if he rejects both o¤ers. Hence, acceptable o¤ers must be such that
Using b V D 1 to denote the post-acquisition pro…t of D i , the associated payo¤s of D i if its o¤er is accepted is
if it is foreclosed. With these payo¤s in place, we now prove the following result:
Proposition 9: Suppose that D 1 and D 2 compete for the acquisition of a controlling stake in U 1 and assume that U 1 has initially a single controlling shareholder. Then,
V D F and U 1 will accept one of these o¤ ers at random; the acquirer, D i , will use its control over U 1 to foreclose the downstream rival D j .
(ii) if G < C L, then in equilibrium, neither downstream …rm acquires a su¢ ciently small controlling stake in U 1 such that after the acquisition the rival will be foreclosed.
control over U 1 , it will use it to foreclose D j (D i 's gain from foreclosure exceeds its share in U 1 's loss). Hence, the post-acquisition payo¤s are b
The highest premium that D i will o¤er is therefore
which is the di¤erence between D i 's payo¤ if it acquires control over U 1 and if D j acquires it.
Noting that V D F < V D 0 (foreclosure hurts D j ), and that by assumption, G C L; and recalling
Hence, by (21), the o¤er will be accepted by U 1 's controller. Consequently, in equilibrium,
, and U 1 's controller accepts one of the two o¤ers at random. Next, suppose that G < C L. Now, an acquisition will lead to the foreclosure of D j only if D i acquires a su¢ ciently small controlling stake, , such that G > L, but not if it acquires the entire stake C . However if D i acquires a su¢ ciently small stake such that G > L, then by (21),
where the strict inequality follows since G < C L. Therefore, there does not exist an equilibrium in which D i alone makes a bid for U 1 and then uses its control over U 1 to foreclosure D j .
Finally, we need to check that there does not exist an equilibrium in which both D 1 and D 2 o¤er to acquire controlling stakes in
then D j will be foreclosed). Such an equilibrium might exists since each D i fears that if it will not acquire control, its rival will, and will use its control in U 1 to foreclose it. Now, assume by way of negation that such an equilibrium exists. Since these o¤ers lead to foreclosure, U 1 would accept 
If D i makes the minimal acceptable bid, its payo¤ under the deviation is
which exceeds D i 's payo¤ in the candidate equilibrium since by assumption, G < C L.
Intuitively, competition between D 1 and D 2 induces the two …rms to o¤er more money to U 1 's controller because each …rm fears that if it does not acquire a controlling stake in U 1 , its rival will acquire it and will use it to foreclose it. However, competition between D 1 and D 2 does not alter the range of parameters for which acquisition which leads foreclosure takes place.
We now turn to the case where initially, U 1 's ownership is dispersed. The two downstream …rms D 1 and D 2 make simultaneous tender o¤ers to U 1 's shareholders. Each o¤er speci…es the maximal stake i that D i o¤ers to acquire and a price that re ‡ects a value V i for the entire …rm.
The shareholders observe the two o¤ers and decide whether to tender to D 1 , to D 2 , or hold on to their shares. If more than i shares are tendered to D i , then the tendered shares are prorated. D i obtains control over U 1 if it acquires more shares than D 2 and if its …nal stake is at least .
Proposition 10: Suppose that D 1 and D 2 compete over the acquisition of a controlling stake in U 1 , who initially has a dispersed ownership and assume that if
in equilibrium, D i o¤ ers to acquire shares for a price that re ‡ects value
All shareholders tender to D i who gains control of U 1 and then uses it to foreclose D j .
(ii) if G < L, then in equilibrium neither D 1 nor D 2 make a tender o¤ er to U 1 's shareholders.
Proof: Suppose that G > L. If D i gains control over U 1 , then U 1 's shareholders would tender shares only if the o¤ered price, V i , exceeds the post-acquisition value of U 1 (otherwise they are better-o¤ holding on to their shares). Hence, D j would not acquire any shares, while D i would prefer to acquire the minimal stake that ensures control. The resulting post-acquisition payo¤s of D i and D j are therefore:
In equilibrium, it must be that i = j , otherwise D j would outbid D i slightly, and gain control over U 1 . Hence,
Note that since
Hence all shareholders will tender to D i .
To compute V j , notice that in equilibrium, shareholders must be indi¤erent between tendering to D i and tendering to D j , otherwise D i can pro…tably lower V i . Since D i 's o¤er is restricted and therefore prorated, the payo¤ of each shareholder per share if he tenders to D i is V i + (1 ) V U 1 . If the shareholder tenders to D j , his payo¤ per share is V j (recall that in equilibrium no shareholder tenders to D j , so the shareholder's submission will not be prorated). Hence, using (23),
We now show that there do not exist equilibria in which neither D 1 nor D 2 gains control over U 1 . To this end, assume by way of negation that there exists an equilibrium in which 1 < and 2 < . Since neither downstream …rm controls U 1 , neither …rm is foreclosed, so the downstream pro…ts of D 1 and D 2 are both equal to V D 0 . Moreover, both …rms pay a price of V U 0 for the shares they acquire in U 1 (if any); this price is the minimal price needed to induce U 1 's shareholders to tender shares and neither …rm would have an incentive to o¤er a higher price for the shares. Hence, the two …rms break even on the shares they acquire in U 1 so their payo¤s are both equal to V D 0 . Now, holding j …xed, suppose that D i deviates and acquires a stake in U 1 , which ensures that it controls U 1 . Since G > L, D i will use its control over U 1 to foreclose D j . The resulting payo¤
, where the inequality follows since G > L. The deviation then is pro…table and it upsets the putative equilibrium.
Likewise, there do not exist equilibria in which 1 = 2 > . In these equilibria, D 1 and D 2 have joint control over U 1 , so neither …rm is foreclosed. As before, each …rm pays a price of V U 0 for the shares it acquires, so the payo¤ of each …rm equals its downstream pro…t V D 0 . Now, suppose that D i deviates by raising i slightly to 0 i , while continuing to pay V U 0 for the acquired shares. Following the deviation, D i obtains controls over U 1 , and since G > L it uses its control to foreclose D j . The resulting payo¤ of
implying that the deviation is pro…table and it upsets the putative equilibrium.
If 1 = 2 = 1=2, then again neither …rm is foreclosed but now D i cannot raise i without o¤ering a higher price for the shares it buys. If V i > V j , then D i can o¤er to buy i > 1=2, obtain controls over U 1 and use it control to foreclose D j . The resulting payo¤ of D i is then
implying that the deviation is pro…table and it upsets the putative equilibrium. 
Finally, suppose that G < L. Then, an acquisition of a controlling stake in U 1 does not lead to foreclose, so neither downstream …rm has an incentive to acquire control over U 1 .
Proposition 10 is very similar to Proposition 4: the condition under which foreclosure emerges remains the same whether or not D 1 competes with D 2 for the acquisition of control over U 1 .
Conclusions
We consider the e¤ects of partial vertical integration on the foreclosure of downstream competitors.
Our analysis shows that …rms often have incentives to acquire partial rather than full stakes in vertically related …rms and that partial acquisitions may often increase the risk of anticompetitive foreclosure of rivals beyond what is posed by a full vertical integration. The pro…tability of partial acquisitions depends on the ownership structure of the target …rm. We show that an acquisition of an upstream supplier may be unpro…table when the supplier has a single owner, but be pro…table when the supplier has a controlling shareholder who holds less than 100% of the shares and provided the controller's initial share is not too high. Partial acquisition is yet more pro…table when the shares of the supplier are held by dispersed shareholders.
The pro…tability of anticompetitive vertical mergers is higher under partial integration due to the potential to expropriate the target's minority shareholders. When minority shareholders are present the acquirer has to pay the shareholders only a partial compensation for the eventual loss of upstream sales due to the foreclosure of the his downstream rivals. We explore some additional implications of this basic intuition and …nd that it implies that the acquisition of a non-controlling toehold in a supplier often lowers the risk of eventual foreclosure of rivals.
From an antitrust perspective, our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should view partial acquisitions of control in upstream suppliers as posing a potential bigger anticompetitive risk than similar acquisitions in which all shares are acquired. Antitrust authorities should be particularly wary when the acquisition is carried out through a tender o¤er to dispersed shareholders. On the other hand, an acquisition of a noncontrolling share in an upstream supplier does not facilitate the eventual acquisition of full control and, at least from this perspective, should not be viewed as harmful.
The analysis is also relevant to the large literature on corporate government and the protection of minority shareholders. Our paper suggests that …rms with a large share of minority shareholders are particularly attractive targets to value-decreasing acquisitions by their downstream buyers, who may then abuse their control to foreclose product-market competitors to the disadvantage of the target's minority shareholders. The paper thus formalizes the wide-spread notion that the foreclosure of rivals can be an important source of private bene…ts to acquirers in takeovers in which vertically-related …rms are involved.
Appendix
Following are three examples. The …rst example motivates the assumptions that we impose in Sections 2 and 3 on the downstream pro…t functions. The second and third examples show that our basic setup is consistent with varaints of the two main raising your rivals costs models of input foreclosure: In Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990), and Salinger (1988) .
An example
Suppose that …rms D 1 and D 2 are located at the two ends of a unit line and compete by setting prices. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit line. The utility of a consumer located at a distance x from …rm D 1 if he buys from D 1 is given by
where v log (n 1 + 1) is the "quality" of D 1 , which increases with the number of inputs, n 1 , it uses, t > 0 is the transportation cost per unit of distance, and p 1 is the price that D 1 charges. If the consumer buys from D 2 , his utility is
If the consumer does not buy at all, his utility is 0.
Assuming that the market is fully covered, the location of the indi¤erent consumer between
Assuming in addition that D 1 and D 2 pay a …xed price for the inputs and normalizing their additional costs to 0, the gross pro…ts of D 1 and D 2 are given by
Solving for the Nash equilibrium prices, we obtain:
To avoid uninteresting complications, we shall assume that log
v for all n 1 and n 2 ; this assumption ensures that p 1 (n 1 ; n 2 ) and p 2 (n 1 ; n 2 ) are both nonnegative. Substituting p 1 (n 1 ; n 2 ) and p 2 (n 1 ; n 2 ) in (25), and the sunstituting the result in U 1 (x), reveals that in equilibrium, the utility of the indi¤erent consumer is
The market is covered, as we assume, provided that U 1 (x (n 1 ; n 2 )) 0. This inequality holds if 3t v < log (n 1 + 1) + log (n 2 + 1). Substituting p 1 (n 1 ; n 2 ), p 2 (n 1 ; n 2 ) in the pro…t functions and using (25), the pro…t of a downstream …rm when it uses k inputs and its rival uses l inputs (e.g., the pro…t of D 1 when
Our assumption that log
v ensures that (k; l) is increasing with k and decreasing with l as Assumption 1 states. Now,
Assumption 3 holds since
Assumption 2 holds if
while Assumption A4 holds if
for all k and all l. Moreover, Assumption A5 holds if
Since log N N +1 < 0, this inequality holds if the square bracketed term is negative, i.e., if
7.2 A variant of Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990) In this example we develop a variant of the Ordover, Salop and Saloner (1990) model (henceforth OSS) which is consistent with our basic setup. OSS consider two upstream suppliers, U 1 and U 2 , which produce a homogenous input and sell it to two symmetric downstream …rms, D 1 and D 2 , which produce substitute products and compete by setting prices. Since U 1 and U 2 engage in Bertrand competition in the upstream market, their pro…t under non-integration is 0. By de…nition then, an upstream suppliers cannot lose from vertical integration. Clearly the OSS setting is extreme. To make it more realistic and ensure that U 1 and U 2 earn a pro…t before integration, we will modify the OSS setting slightly by assuming that the upstream costs are random. 20 Speci…cally, we assume that the per unit cost of each upstream supplier i, c i , is either high, c, or low, c, with equal probabilities, independently across the two suppliers (OSS assume that U 1 and U 2 have the same per unit cost, which is deterministic). Given their cost realizations, U 1 and U 2 set the prices of their respective inputs. Then downstream …rms, D 1 and D 2 , buy the inputs, convert each unit of input to one unit of the …nal product, at no additional cost, set their respective prices, and sell to …nal consumers.
Let w 1 and w 2 be the prices that D 1 and D 2 pay for the input. Since inputs are converted to outputs on a 1:1 basis, w 1 and w 2 are also the marginal costs of D 1 and D 2 . The pro…t of each downstream …rm i is then given by
where p i and p j are the downstream prices and q i (p i ; p j ) is …rm i's quantity. Since the products of D 1 and D 2 are (imperfect) substitutes, q i (p i ; p j ) decreases with p i and increases with p j .
The equilibrium price of each downstream …rm i is p i (w i ; w j ) and its corresponding pro…t is i (w i ; w j ).
Lemma 1: i (w i ; w j ) decreases with w i and assuming that p i increases with w i , i (w i ; w j ) also increases with w j .
Proof of Lemma 1: Let b w i > w i and let q i (w i ; w j ) q i (p i (w i ; w j ) ; p j (w i ; w j )). Then by revealed preferences,
where the …rst inequality follows because p j (w i ; b w j ) > p j (w i ; w j ) and because the two …nal products are substitutes, so p j (w i ; b w j ) > p j (w i ; w j ) implies that q i (w i ; b w j ) > q i (w i ; w j ) and the second inequality follows by revealed preference.
Nonintegration
Since the input is homogenous, both input prices under nonintegration are equal to c if c 1 = c 2 = c and c if c 1 = c 2 = c. When c i = c and c j = c, U i can always undercut U j slightly and sell to both D 1 and D 2 , so in equilibrium, only U i sells the input. We will assume that the di¤erence between c and c is not too large in the sense that U i will prefer to set the input price at c.
Assuming that in case of a tie, D 1 and D 2 buy from the lowest cost supplier (and if costs are the same, they randomize their purchases), it follows that in equilibrium,
c if c 1 = c 2 = c; c otherwise.
Let1 (c; c) = q 2 (c; c) be the equilibrium output levels when w 1 = w 2 = c, and de…ne q similarly. The associated downstream prices are p p 1 (c; c) = p 2 (c; c) and p = p 1 (c; c) = p 2 (c; c) :
Since the input is converted to output on a 1:1 basis, q and q are also the demands for the input.
The expected pro…t of each supplier is then:
This expression re ‡ects the fact that a nonintegrated supplier U i earns a positive pro…t only when c i = c and c j = c; the probability of this event is 
where 1 (c; c) = q (p c) ; 1 (c; c) = q p c :
Integration
When U 1 and D 1 integrate, U 1 supplies D 1 at cost, unless c 1 = c and c 2 = c, in which case U 2 sells the input to D 1 at a price equal to c. Hence, D 1 buys the input from U 1 at c if c 1 = c and at c if c 1 = c 2 = c, and buys it from U 2 at c if c 1 = c and c 2 = c. Note that in all cases, w 1 = c 1 .
As in OSS, we assume that when U 1 and D 1 integrate, U 1 commits not to sell to D 2 . 21 Hence U 2 becomes the sole supplier to D 2 and sets the input price, w 2 , to maximize its pro…t (w 2 c 2 ) q 2 (c 1 ; w 2 ) :
We will assume that this pro…t is concave in w 2 . This assumption holds for example in the linear demand example shown below. The pro…t maximizing value of w 2 is de…ned implicitly by the following …rst-order condition:
The solution 2 1 There is a debate about U1's ability to make this commiment: see Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rei¤en (1992) , and see Ordover, Salop, and Saloner (1992) for a response. Several papers have proposed models that are immune to this criticism, inluding Ma (1997 ), Chen (2001 , Choi and Yi (2001) , and Church and Gandal (2000) . We will follow OSS in assuming that U1 can commit not to sell to D2 because our purpose here is to show that a (variant of) the OSS model predicts that there are cases in which G > L and there are cases in which the opposite holds.
That is, vertical integration and the foreclosure of D 2 boost the pro…t of D 1 . Since U 1 commits not to sell to D 2 and since it transfers the input to D 1 at cost, its pro…t is V U 1 = 0. Given that its pre-merger pro…t is V U 0 > 0, it follows that integration and the foreclosure of D 2 involve a transfer of pro…ts from U 1 to D 1 .
Vertical integration is pro…table if the downstream gain exceeds the upstream loss:
where G is the downstream bene…t from vertical integration and the foreclosure of D 2 and L is the associated upstream loss. The next example shows that G > L for a broad range of parameters.
Example
Assume that q i = A p i + p j , where 2 [0; 1] is the degree of product di¤erentiation. The pro…t of each downstream …rm i is i = q i (p i w i ). The Nash equilibrium when both …rms choose their prices simultaneously is The equilibrium pro…ts are 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = q 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ) 2 and 2 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = q 2 (w 1 ; w 2 ) 2 . Notice that i (w i ; w j ) decreases with w i and increases with w j , as Lemma 1 above states.
Given these expressions, the expected pre-merger pro…ts of D and U 1 are: To calculate the price at which U 2 sells to D 2 after U 1 and D 1 integrate, recall that after integration, w 1 = c 1 . Substituting q 2 (c 1 ; w 2 ) into (28) and solving for w 2 yields w 2 (c 1 ; c 2 ) = (2 + ) A + 2 2 c 2 + c 1 2 (2 2 ) :
Hence, the pro…t of D 1 , given c 1 and c 2 , is 1 (c 1 ; w 2 (c 1 ; c 2 )) = q 1 (c 1 ; w 2 (c 1 ; c 2 )) 2 = A c 1 8 9 2 + 2 4 + c 2 2 2 2 (2 2 ) (4 2 ) To simplify the computations, we will use the normalizations A = 1 and c = 0. To ensure that w 2 (c; c) c, we will also c 2 + 4 2 2 :
Substituting from (31), (32), and (33) into (30) and using the normalizations, we get 
This expression depends only on the degree of product di¤erentiation, , and on c. Salinger (1988) This example shows that our basic setup is also consistent with Salinger (1988) . In his model, there are N 2 symmetric upstream suppliers U 1 ; :::; U N , which is produce a homogenous input at a cost c per unit. The upstream …rms compete by setting quantities and the input price, w, clears the input market. For simplicity, we will assume here that there are only two downstream …rms, D 1 and D 2 , which convert the input to a …nal product on a 1:1 basis at no additional cost. The two downstream …rms also compete by setting quantities. The demand for the …nal good is given by p = A Q; where Q is the sum of the quantities of D 1 and D 2 .
Nonintegration
Since D 1 and D 2 convert the input to a …nal product on a 1:1 basis at no additional cost, their marginal costs are equal to the input price w. Noting that D 1 and D 2 engage in Cournot competition, the output of each …rm is A w 3 . Hence, the total demand for the input is Q = 2(A w) 3
, so the inverse demand for the input is w = A 
Integration
As Salinger argues, when U 1 and D 1 integrate, U 1 …nds it optimal to withdraw from the input market and supply only D 1 , who buys the input at a cost c: Hence, V U 1 = 0, implying that the upstream loss from vertical integration is L = V U 0 . Now, D 2 buys the input at w, while D 1 buys it at c. In a Nash equilibrium in the downstream market, the output of D 1 is 
Substituting from (37), (36), and (38) into (30) and using the normalizations, we get This expression positive for all N so vertical integration is always pro…table in the Salinger model.
